We analyze relational contracting between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable. We deduce optimal team incentive contracts under di¤erent set of assumptions, and show that the principal can use team size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the agents'incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents'outputs. We also show that more agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team member's e¤ort incentives, in particular if outputs are negatively correlated.
Introduction
Incentive contracts within …rms, between a principal and her agents, are often based on performance measures that are hard to verify by a third party (see e.g. MacLeod and Parent, 1999, and Gibbs et al, 2004 ). The quality or value of the agents'performance may be observable to the principal, but The literature has studied this problem under the assumption that the agents' individual outputs are non-veri…able, but still observable for the contracting parties (as in Levin, 2002 and . However, agents often work in teams in which only aggregate output is observable, while individual outputs are non-observable. 1 While a team's aggregate output may be easier to verify than individual outputs, there is still a range of situations in which a team's output is non-veri…able. Teams are also, like individuals, exposed to discretionary bonuses and subjective performance evaluation, which by de…nition cannot be externally enforced. 2 In this paper, we thus analyze a relational contract between a principal and a team of agents where only the team's aggregate output is observable. We 1 A majority of …rms in the US and UK report some use of teamwork in which groups of employees share the same goals or objectives, and the incidence of team work has been increasing over time (see Shaw, 2007 and Bandiera et al, 2012 , and the references therein). 2 As an example, …rms often promise …xed bonus pools to a team of workers before they allocate discretionary individual rewards within the team. However, the size of the team's bonus pool may also be discretionary, or non-contractible, and …rms will need relational contracts in order to commit to actual pay the total team bonus as promised, see Glover and Xue (2014) and Deb et al (2015) and the references therein. Another example is corporate bonuses or division bonuses, which by de…nition are group-based, and often discretionarily determined by the board at the end of the year.
show that when the maximum team bonus is limited by the relational contract, the principal can use team size and team composition as instruments in order to improve incentives. In particular, the principal can strengthen the agents'incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents' outputs. 3 These outputs will often be positively correlated, for instance if team members are exposed to the same business cycles. In other situations, agents' outputs are negatively correlated, for instance when specialists with di¤erent expertise are di¤erently exposed to business cycles, or meet di¤erent sets of demands from customers or superiors. In this paper we investigate how the principal can use information about correlation between the workers'individual output in order to implement optimal team based incentives. Moreover, we investigate how adding more agents to a team a¤ect incentives. In particular, we ask: can a larger team do better (in terms of output per agent) than a smaller team? That is: can a larger team yield higher-powered incentives?
We …rst show that as long as the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) holds, the optimal team incentive scheme is simple: Each agent is paid a bonus for aggregate output above a threshold. However, when MLRP does not hold (which may well be the case under correlated outputs), then it may be optimal to reward the team for e.g. low and high output, but not for intermediate ones. Moreover, we show that if individual outputs are stochastically independent, more agents in the team always reduces e¤ort.
However, once outputs are correlated (positively or negatively), the 1=n free-rider problem does not generally hold. More agents in the team may under certain conditions increase each team members' e¤ort incentives, in particular if outputs are negatively correlated.
The general mechanism that lies behind these results is as follows: In any relational contract there is a maximal self-enforcing bonus; its magnitude is bounded by the value of the future relationship. For this given bonus, incentives will be maximal when the bonus is awarded for all outcomes where the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of those outcomes is positive. Correlation among individual outputs will a¤ect the distribution of team output, and hence also these marginal e¤ort e¤ects; their signs as well as their magnitudes. Thus it will a¤ect the set of outputs for which the bonus is awarded, as well as the individual e¤ort incentives generated by this bonus. Whenever the latter is strengthened by adding another agent to the team, the bigger team will do better. We show that this is often more likely under negative than under positive correlation.
These e¤ects, and in particular the e¤ects of correlated outputs on the team's e¢ ciency, turn out to be quite transparent and very striking in the case of normally distributed outputs. The MLRP then holds for team output, and hence the bonus is optimally awarded for output above a threshold. Moreover, the individual marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of obtaining the bonus is inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the team's output. Hence, since the standard deviation is reduced (increased) when more agents are added under negative (positive) correlation, a larger team provides stronger incentives and thus performs better if and only if individual outputs are negatively correlated. Under normally distributed outputs, this result is thus related to the fact that by including more agents in the team, we may obtain a more precise performance measure. This is bene…-cial not because a more precise measure reduces risk (since all agents are risk neutral by assumption), but because it strengthens, for any given bonus level, the incentives for each team member to provide e¤ort. The analysis of the normal case reveals that for su¢ ciently small variance, the standard …rst order approach (used by e.g. Levin, 2003) is not valid, but we show that a threshold bonus is nevertheless optimal, and we characterize its properties.
However, the results of the normal case may well not hold for other distributions; in particular we may have MLRP satis…ed for individual outputs, but not for aggregate output. This will a¤ect the shape of optimal incentive schemes, and will generally also a¤ect how optimal schemes and associated e¤orts are in ‡uenced by correlations between individual outputs. We therefore also analyze a setting with discrete (binary) outputs, and characterize conditions under which a larger team will do better, but also show that a hurdle scheme may well not be optimal in this setting.
Our results have several implications. First, the canonical 1=n free-rider problem does not generally hold. This may inform practitioners and empirical researchers: Under correlated outputs, larger teams may actually do better than smaller ones. Second, threshold schemes are not necessarily optimal under correlated outputs, and may in fact lead to perverse incentives under certain conditions. Empirical researchers who observe team incentives schemes that fail, may wrongfully infer that it is due to a freerider problem. Third, the positive incentive e¤ects of negative correlation relates to questions concerning optimal team composition. One can conjecture that negative correlations are more associated with heterogeneous teams than homogenous teams, and also more associated with task-related diversity (functional expertise, education, organizational tenure) than with bio-demographic diversity (age, gender, ethnicity). There is no reason to believe that e.g. men and women's outputs are negatively correlated. However, workers with di¤erent functional expertise may be di¤erently exposed to common shocks, and meet di¤erent sets of demands. This can give rise to negative output correlations. Interestingly, a comprehensive meta-study by Horwitz and Horwitz (2007) , investigating 35 papers on the topic, …nds no relationship between bio-demographic diversity and performance, but a strong positive relationship between team performance and task-related diversity. 4 An explanation is that task-related diversity creates positive complementarity e¤ects. We point to an alternative explanation, namely that diversity may create negative correlations that increases each agents' marginal incentives for e¤ort. The team members "must step forward when others fail". Diversity and heterogeneity among team members can thus yield considerable e¢ ciency improvements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related literature, while in Section 3 we introduce the model. Section 4 analyzes the case of normally distributed outputs, while Section 5 considers discrete outputs. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
We study optimal incentive contracts for n > 1 agents when both individual outputs are unobservable and aggregate output is non-veri…able. Non-veri…able output calls for relational contracts, and relational contracts between a principal and a team of agents where only aggregate output is observable has (to our best knowledge) not yet been studied. Levin (2002) considers a multilateral relational contract between a principal and n > 1 agents, but where individual outputs are observable and stochastically independent. He shows among other things that a tournament scheme is optimal.
The few relational contracting papers on team incentives also consider situations in which individual outputs are observable. Here, team incentives turns out optimal due to repeated interaction between agents (Kvaløy and Although we focus on the multiagent case, our paper is indebted to the seminal literature on bilateral relational contracts, starting with Klein and Le-er (1981), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bull (1987) . 5 MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) provides a general treatment of the symmetric information case, while (the now in ‡uential paper by) Levin (2003) generalizes the case of asymmetric information. Our threshold scheme, in which each agent is paid a maximal bonus for aggregate output above a threshold and a minimal (no) bonus otherwise, parallels Levin's (2003) characterization for the single-agent case. However, while Levin (like most other papers in this literature) uses the standard …rst order approach (FOA), we characterize the optimal bonus scheme in our application (the normal case) also when FOA is not valid, and we show that it is in fact a threshold scheme. Technically this hinges on MLRP being valid for team output. In fact, the analysis shows that in the single-agent case, MLRP will generally ensure that a threshold bonus is optimal (whether FOA is valid or not).
Our paper also relates to the literature on optimal team incentives. This literature is twofold. One strand, starting with Alchian and Demsetz (1972), assume, like us, that individual output is unobservable, but (unlike us) that aggregate output is veri…able. The main focus is then on the free-rider problem, and how it can be solved or mitigated with legally enforceable contracts. 6 Such contracts are not feasible here.
Another strand of the literature studies team incentives when individual output is observable. The idea is that the principal, by tying compensation to the joint performance of a team of agents, can foster cooperation (e.g. Itoh; 1991 Holmström and Milgrom, 1990 Our focus on stochastic dependencies also relates to the literature on relative performance evaluation. By tying compensation to an agent's relative performance, the principal can improve e¢ ciency by …ltering out common noise and thereby expose them to less risk (Holmström, 1982; and Mookherjee, 1984 ). 7 We show that correlation may improve e¢ ciency even in the absence of risk considerations. In this respect, the correlation e¤ects we demonstrate (in the normal case application) relates to insights from the …nance literature, starting with Diamond (1984) who show that correlated signals/shocks may reduce output variance and thus reduce entrepreneurs' moral hazard opportunities towards investors.
Although the literature on team incentives generally recognizes team size as an important determinant for team performance, questions concerning optimal team size has received limited attention. Most notable are the con- 6 Holmström (1982) formalized Alchian and Demsetz argument and showed that a budget breaker who holds claim on the team's output can assure …rst best e¤ort incentives. A literature has followed that both extend and re…ne Holmström's insights (e.g. Rasmussen, 1987, and McAfee and McMillan (1991) , including papers showing that the budget breaking requirement is too strong, and that …rst-best incentives can be achieved without requiring that all agents are made residual claimant (Legros and Matsushima, 1991; Legros and Matthews, 1993) . 7 Fleckinger (2012) provides a more general treatment of stochastic dependencies and RPE, and shows that greater correlation in outcomes does not neccesarily call for RPE schemes. 
The setting
We analyze an ongoing economic relationship between a principal and n (symmetric) agents. The agents constitute a team. All parties are risk neutral. Each period, each agent i exerts e¤ort e i incurring a private cost c(e i ). Costs are strictly increasing and convex in e¤ort, i.e., c 0 (e i ) > 0, c 00 (e i ) > 0 and c(0) = c 0 (0) = 0. Each agent's e¤ort generates a stochastic contribution (output) x i to the team's total output y = x i . Agents are symmetric, and each agent's output has a probability distribution depending only on the agent's own e¤ort, and represented by a CDF F (x i ; e i ). We focus here on team e¤ects generated by stochastic dependencies among agents' contributions, and thus assume a simple linear "production structure", but allow individual outputs to be stochastically dependent. Expected outputs are given by x(e i ) = E( x i j e i ) = R x i dF (x i ; e i ) and total surplus per agent is W (e i ) = x(e i ) c(e i ). First best is then achieved when x 0 (e F B i ) c 0 (e F B i ) = 0. Outputs are stochastically independent (given e¤orts) across time.
The parties cannot contract on e¤ort provision. We assume that e¤ort e i is hidden and only observed by agent i. With respect to output, we assume that only total output y = x i is observable, and moreover non-veri…able by a third party. Hence, the parties cannot write a legally enforceable contract on output provision, but have to rely on self-enforcing relational contracts.
Each period, the principal and the agents then face the following contracting situation. First, the principal o¤ers a contract saying that agent i receives a non-contingent …xed salary i plus a bonus b i (y), i = 1:::n conditional on total output y = x i from the n agents. 8 Second, the agents simultaneously choose e¤orts, and value realization y = x i is revealed. Third, the parties observe y and the …xed salary i is paid. Then the parties choose whether or not to honor the contingent bonus contract b i (y).
Conditional on e¤orts, agent i's expected wage in the contract is then w i = E( b i (y)j e 1 :::e n ) + i , while the principal expects = E( yj e 1 :::e n ) w i = i E( x i j e i ) w i . If the contract is expected to be honored, agent i chooses e¤ort e i to maximize his payo¤, i.e.
e i = arg max Now, (given that (IC) holds) the principal will honor the contract with all agents i = 1; 2; :::; n if
where is a common discount factor. The LHS of the inequality shows the principal's expected present value from honoring the contract, which involves paying out the promised bonuses and then receiving the expected value from relational contracting in all future periods. The RHS shows the expected present value from reneging, which implies breaking up the relational contract and receive the reservation value in all future periods.
Agent i will honor the contract if
where similarly the LHS shows the agent's expected present value from honoring the contract, while the RHS shows the expected present value from reneging.
Following established procedures (e.g. Levin 2002 ) we have the following:
Lemma 1 For given e¤ orts e = (e 1 :::e n ) there is a wage scheme that satis…es (IC,EP,EA) and hence implements e, i¤ there are bonuses b i (y) and …xed salaries i with b i (y) 0, i = 1; :::; n; such that (IC) and condition (EC) below holds:
To see su¢ ciency, set the …xed wages i such that each agent's payo¤ in the contract equals his reservation payo¤, i.e. i + E( b i (y)j e) c(e i ) = 0. Then EA holds since b i (y) 0. Moreover, the principal's payo¤ in the contract will be = i W (e i ) i.e. the surplus generated by the contract. Then EC implies that EP holds. Necessity follows by standard arguments.
Unless otherwise explicitly noted, we will follow the standard assumption in the literature and assume that the …rst order approach (FOA) is valid, and hence that each agent's optimal e¤ort choice is given by the …rst-order condition (FOC):
We will refer to this as a 'modi…ed'IC constraint.
The optimal contract now maximizes total surplus
c(e i ))) subject to EC and the 'modi…ed'IC constraint (1). To state our …rst result, let G(y; e 1 :::e n ) denote the CDF for team output y = x i . We will consider discrete as well as continuos outputs, and will let g(y; e 1 :::e n ) denote the probability of outcome y in the former case, and the density at outcome y in the latter. We will further say that the 'monotone likelihood ratio property'(MLRP) holds for aggregate output y if
g(y;e) is increasing in y. Then we have the following:
The optimal symmetric scheme pays a maximal bonus to each agent for all outputs y for which Letting Y n + be the set of outcomes for which
g(y; e 1 :::e n ) > 0 under equilibrium e¤orts (and given that FOA is valid), then these e¤orts are given by the IC constraint (1), where now the marginal incentive for e¤ort is b
::e n ). For given bonus of magnitude b, the marginal incentive for e¤ort is here determined by the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on the probability of obtaining the bonus. This bonus is in turn determined by EC, and thus we have in equilibrium
This equilibrium will depend on team size (n) and team composition-in particular the type of stochastic dependencies among members'contributionsvia the term
::e n ), i.e. via the marginal e¤ect of individual e¤ort (ME) on the probability of obtaining the bonus under the optimal scheme. Any variation -in team size or composition-that makes this marginal e¤ect of e¤ort stronger, will improve team e¢ ciency in the sense that it will allow higher individual e¤orts to be implemented.
In particular, to analyse variations in team size n for the optimal scheme in Proposition 1, de…ne
where we have emphasized that team output y n = n 1 x i depends on n, and where the partial on the RHS is evaluated at e = (e 1 :::e n ) with all individual e¤orts equal (due to symmetry). Comparing teams of size n and n + 1, it is clear that If e i = e n 1 is optimal for team size n, and
then the larger team (of size n + 1) can implement higher individual e¤orts, and will thus be more e¢ cient. It turns out that this can not occur if the agents' contributions/outputs are independent, and thus we have the following.
Proposition 2 For stochastically independent outputs we have m n+1 (e i ) m n (e i ) for all e i ; hence incentives for e¤ ort will then decrease with increasing team size.
This tells us immediately that for increasing team size to be bene…cial in this setting, individual contributions must be stochastically dependent. To this we now turn.
Normally distributed outputs
We will now consider normally distributed outputs. As in several other areas, e.g. tournaments (Lazear-Rosen 1981) or multi-tasking (HolmstromMilgrom 1991), this assumption greatly simpli…es the analysis, and can be highly relevant for applications. So we now consider the case where outputs are (multi)normally distributed and correlated. We assume also that covariances are independent of e¤orts. Given this assumption, and (by symmetry) each x i being N (e i ; s 2 ), then total output y = x i is also normal with expectation Ey = e i and variance
Letting g(y; e 1 :::e n ) denote the density of y, it follows from the form of the normal density that the likelihood ratio is linear and given by ge i (y;e 1 :::en) g(y;e 1 :::en) = (y e i )=s n . As shown in Proposition 1, the optimal bonus is maximal (minimal) for outcomes where the likelihood ratio is positive (negative), and hence has a threshold y 0 = e i in equilibrium. Applying the normal distribution, it then follows (as shown below, see (5)) that the marginal return to e¤ort for each agent in equilibrium is given by
The marginal return to e¤ ort is thus inversely proportional to the standard deviation of total output in this setting. This implies that a team composition that reduces this standard deviation, and thus increases the precision of the available performance measure (total output) will improve incentives and thus be bene…cial here. 10 The IC condition (1) for each agent's (symmetric) equilibrium e¤ort is now
, and it then follows that the maximal e¤ort per agent that can be sustained, is given by
Consider now a variation in team size. When all agents' outputs are fully symmetric in the sense that all correlations as well as all variances are equal across agents, i.e. var(x i ) = s 2 and corr(x i ; x j ) = for all i; j, then the variance in total output will be
If 0 the variance will increase with n, and this will be detrimental for e¢ ciency. Optimal n should therefore be smaller with larger . Moreover, the standard deviation of total output (s n ) increases rapidly with n when 0 (at least of order p n), hence the e¤ort per agent that can be sustained will then decrease rapidly with n. Large teams are therefore very ine¢ cient if all agents'outputs are non-negatively correlated.
For negative correlations the situation is quite di¤erent. If < 0 one can in principle reduce the variance to (almost) zero by including su¢ ciently many agents. The model then indicates that adding more and more agents to the team is bene…cial, at least as long as 1 + (n 1) > 0 and the conditions for FOA to be valid are ful…lled. 11 (We show below that for this to be the case, the variance of the performance measure, here s 2 n , cannot be too small.)
Note that assuming symmetric pairwise negative correlations among n stochastic variables only makes sense if the sum has non-negative variance, and hence 1 + (n 1) 0. 12 Given < 0, there can thus only be a maximum number n of such variables (agents). And given n > 2, we must have
Note also that for given negative > 1 2 , the variance is …rst increasing, then decreasing in n (it is maximal for n = (includes all).
Proposition 3 For normally distributed outputs, e¢ ciency decreases rapidly with team size if outputs are non-negatively correlated. For symmetric agents with negatively correlated outputs, e¢ ciency …rst decreases (for n > 2) and then increases with increasing team size, hence e¢ ciency is maximal either for a small or for a large team (within the feasible range).
The assumption of equal pairwise correlations among all involved agents is admittedly somewhat special, but illustrates in a simple way the forces at play when the team size varies. In reality there might be positive as well as negative correlations among agents. A procedure to pick agents for least variance would then be for each n, to pick those n that yield the smallest variance.
Optimal schemes when FOA fails
We will now …rst examine under what conditions the FOA is valid for the normal model analyzed here, and second derive optimal bonus schemes when FOA fails in this setting. A recent literature has examined such issues for static moral hazard with contractible outputs, see Kadan and Swinkels (2013), Ewerhart (2014) and Kirkegaard (2014) , but not (to our best knowledge) for moral hazard in relational contracting, neither for single-agent nor multiagent settings.
So consider y normally distributed with expectation Ey = e i and a variance that will be denoted by s 2 = var(y) in this section (to simplify notation).
As already noted, this distribution satis…es MLRP. Given that FOA holds, and the principal seeks to implement e¤ort e i from each agent, the optimal bonus b(y) has a threshold at y 0 = e i = ne i . Agent i's expected payo¤, given own e¤ort e i and e¤orts e j = e i from the other agents, is then
where H() is the CDF for an N (0; s 2 ) distribution. The FOC for the agent's choice is
where h() is the density; h() = H 0 (). The FOA is valid if the agent's optimal choice is e i and is given by this …rst-order condition, i.e. if
and no other e¤ort e i 6 = e i yields a higher payo¤ for the agent. We note in passing that h(0) = 1= p 2 var(y), verifying the formula (2) above.
Due to the shape of the normal density, the agent's payo¤ is generally not concave. 13 The payo¤ is locally concave at e i = e i (since h 0 (0) = 0), hence e i is a local maximum, but there may be other local maxima (other solutions to FOC) for e i < e i . The situation is illustrated in Figure 1 , which depicts the agent's marginal revenue (bh(e i e i )) and marginal cost for two values of the variance s 2 = var(y). If the variance is su¢ ciently small there is a local maximum at some e i < e i (satisfying the FOC), and the …gure indicates (comparing areas under MC and MR) that this local maximum dominates that at e i .
(See Figure 1 in the appendix) 1 3 The second derivative is bh 0 (e i ei) c 00 (ei), where h 0 (e i ei) < 0 for ei < e i .
This indicates that the FOA is valid here only if the variance of the performance measure (y) is not too small, and is con…rmed in the following proposition. 14 (The …rst part of the proposition also follows from a general result by Hwang 2016 on the validity of FOA in the single agent case.)
Moreover, this proposition con…rms that a symmetric solution with equal e¤orts across agents is then indeed optimal.
Proposition 4 For the normal case y N ( i e i ; s 2 ) the …rst order approach is valid if the variance of output s 2 is su¢ ciently large, but not valid if s 2 is su¢ ciently small. In the former case, symmetric e¤ orts is indeed optimal.
For negatively correlated agents, the variance in the performance measure y can be made quite small by including many agents in the team. We saw that this was bene…cial for incentives and consequently for e¢ ciency as long as the analysis building on FOA was valid. But for su¢ ciently small variance FOA is not valid, so this immediately raises the question of what a team can achieve under such circumstances. In the following we will show that a threshold bonus is nevertheless always optimal for the team model with normally distributed outputs, and moreover characterize its properties.
The EC constraint for symmetric e¤orts is 0 b(y) 1 W (e i ). To provide incentives, the bonus cannot be maximal for all outputs y, hence the expected bonus payment for an agent must be less than the maximal bonus, i.e. E( b(y)j e i ; e i ) < 1 W (e i ). On the other hand, the agent's expected payo¤ from exerting e¤ort must be non-negative; E( b(y)j e i ; e i ) c(e i ) E( b(y)j e i = 0; e i ) 0, so in any symmetric equilibrium we must have c(e i ) < 1 W (e i ). It follows from this that the e¤ort e u and associated surplus W (e u ) de…ned by
constitute upper bounds for, respectively, the e¤ort and surplus (per agent) that can be achieved in a relational contract. 15 Note also that this upper bound can be achieved if there is no uncertainty, i.e. if (team) e¤ort can be observed without noise; namely by paying the maximal bonus b = c(e u ) to each agent conditional on total e¤ort being at least ne u .
We will now show that the optimal bonus is a threshold bonus which induces e¤ort that converges to the upper bound as the variance in the performance measure goes to zero. The scheme is a simple modi…cation of the threshold bonus scheme identi…ed in the FOA analysis, and consists of a relaxation of the threshold combined with an increase of the bonus relative to the latter scheme.
To show this let, for any (symmetric) bonus b = b(y), agent i's performancerelated payo¤ (utility) be denoted u(b; e) = u(b; e i ; e i ) = R b(y)g(y; e)dy c(e i )
As a …rst step we show that if a non-threshold and a threshold bonus yield the same payo¤ to the agent (for given e¤ort), the latter bonus yields the strongest marginal incentives. ii) Ifb(y) is not a threshold bonus, and e is the associated equilibrium, then there is a threshold scheme b h (y) with u(b; e ) = u(b h ; e ), u e i (b h ; e ) > u e i (b; e ) = 0 and u(b h ; e i ; e i ) u(b h ; e i ; e i ) for all e i < e i .
Remark Note that in a single-agent case, statement (ii) in the lemma implies that a threshold scheme must be optimal whenever MLRP holds. For should some other scheme be optimal, then (ii) shows that there is a threshold scheme that will induce higher e¤ort by the agent (e i > e i ). This means that the assumptions traditionally invoked to ensure validity of FOA, such as convexity of the distribution function (CDF) in addition to MLRP (as in e.g. Levin 2003) , are much stronger than necessary to ensure that a threshold bonus is optimal in a relational contract with moral hazard. 16 On the other hand, Hwang (2016) has recently shown that a weaker condition than CDF is su¢ cient for FOA to be valid in the single-agent case (irrespective of whether MLRP holds or not).
Using the lemma above, we can show that a threshold bonus will be optimal in the team model with normally distributed output considered in this section.
Proposition 5 For the team model with normally distributed output y N ( i e i ; s 2 ), the optimal symmetric bonus is a threshold bonus.
When FOA is valid, the optimal threshold is the output at which the likelihood ratio is zero, which is the output y 0 = e i in the normally distributed case. The problem with this scheme is that for su¢ ciently small s the agent's payo¤ is non-concave. In particular, for c 0 () convex (c 000 0), the payo¤ has two local maxima 17 , at e i and at e 0 i < e i , respectively, and e 0 i then gives the highest payo¤ for small s, so the agent will deviate from the supposed equilibrium e¤ort e i . Now, this can be recti…ed by setting a lower threshold y 0 0 < y 0 = ne i , i.e. making it easier to obtain the bonus, and at the same time increase the bonus level. We …nd that this is indeed optimal. Proposition 6 For y N ( i e i ; s 2 ) we have: Given convex marginal costs (c 000 0), there is a critical s c > 0 for the standard deviation of output such that for s s c FOA is valid and the optimal threshold y 0 is the output at which the likelihood ratio is zero, thus y 0 = ne i . For s < s c the optimal threshold is an output y 0 0 = ne i , (at which the likelihood ratio is negative), and the optimal scheme is given by (20 -22) in the appendix, with all relations holding with equality. E¤ ort e i is strictly higher when s is lower, and e i ! e u de…ned by (6) as s ! 0.
It may be noted that for the set of variances s 2 = var(y) su¢ ciently large to make FOA valid, the largest e¤ort per agent that can be implemented must satisfy 2c(e i ) 1 W (e i ), and hence be considerably smaller than the upper bound e u de…ned in (6) . This is so because the agent obtains the bonus (b) with probability 1 2 in equilibrium in the FOA scheme, hence 1 7 It follows from the shape of the density h() that for c 0 () convex (c 000 0), the FOC (4) for e¤ort can yield at most two local maxima.
we must have b 1 2 c(e i ) in that setting. This illustrates that a lower output variance can yield considerable bene…ts in relational contracting.
The bene…ts are not associated with risk reduction (since all agents are risk neutral by assumption), nor with sharper competition, since in the team setting there is none. The bene…ts arise because a lower variance strengthens individual incentives for e¤ort, for a given bonus level. Since the bonuses in the relational contract are discretionary and hence must be kept within bounds, the added e¤ort incentives coming from a lower variance are valuable. And the value added may be considerable, as we have seen.
In this subsection we have taken the output variance (s 2 = var(y)) as an exogenous parameter. We know that this variance can be substantially reduced if a team can be put together, consisting of several agents whose individual outputs are negatively correlated. Under normally distributed outputs, an expansion of the team will thus enhance e¢ ciency exactly when it leads a lower variance for the team's output, i.e. a more precise performance measure. The enhanced precision is thus the decisive factor, but this is related to properties of the normal distribution.
Discrete outputs
In the normal case analyzed so far, the precision of the performance measure was a decisive factor, in the sense that higher precision unambiguously lead to stronger individual incentives. The analysis revealed that this partly hinges on the fact that a hurdle scheme was optimal for any team composition, a fact which technically follows from the property that MLRP always holds in the normal case. This may well not hold for other distributions; in particular we may have MLRP satis…ed for individual outputs, but not for aggregate output. This will a¤ect the shape of optimal incentive schemes, and will generally also a¤ect how optimal schemes and associated e¤orts are in ‡uenced by correlations between individual outputs. To this we now turn.
To handle teams with correlated individual contributions (outputs) in a relatively general setting, we consider discrete outputs. Moreover, we assume binary individual outcomes, so an agent's contribution is x i 2 fG; Bg, with G > B 0. Without loss of generality we will normalize and set G = 1 and B = 0. In this setting we can also identify an agent's e¤ort with his/her probability of a good outcome: if p(e i ) is this probability as a function of "natural e¤ort", with p(e i ) 2 [p 0 ; p] [0; 1], p 0 (e i ) > 0, rede…ne e¤ort to be p i = p(e i ) with cost c (p 1 (p i )) . We assume that this cost function is also strictly convex with zero marginal cost at p i = p 0 .
We allow for correlations between team members contributions. Following Fleckinger (2012), the joint distribution for two agents' (i 6 = j) outcomes can be written as
where P (k; l) is the probability of x i = k; x j = l. Given our normalization with x i 2 f1; 0g, the function (:) is simply the covariance between the two agent's outcomes, i.e. (p i ; p j ) = cov(x i ; x j ). To have a manageable and yet interesting model we follow Gupta-Tao (2010) and others and assume that for any n, the random variables x 1 :::x n have no second-or higher-order interactions (see appendix for details). It then follows that the joint distribution of x 1 :::x n , and hence the distribution of total team output y n = n 1 x i , is determined by "e¤orts" p 1 :::p n and covariances (p i ; p j ),i 6 = j. Speci…cally we have:
where the coe¢ cients a j n;k depend on (p 1 ; :::p n 1 ) and can be determined inductively (see appendix), and we de…ne P (y n 0 = r) = 0 for r = 1; n 0 + 1. For independent variables ( 0) this is a standard binomial formula, conditioning on one agent's success or failure (here agent n). The last term in the formula adjusts for stochastic dependencies.
Di¤erentiating this (wrt p n , say) and using symmetry -including symmetric derivatives and p i = p 1 , all i -we obtain
The marginal e¤ect of an agent's e¤ort on the probability that the team achieves y n = k will thus now depend both on the covariance level (via the …rst two terms on the RHS) and on its derivative 1 . These in ‡uences imply, among other things, that optimal bonus schemes may well not be of the simple threshold type, and that a larger team may provide stronger incentives than a smaller one. To illustrate this, we consider the case where the covariance level is independent of e¤ orts, thus = const. 18 Note …rst that under this assumption we have from (8) that all output probabilities, and hence an agent's expected bonus payments, are linear in the agent's e¤ort (p n ), and hence that FOA will certainly be valid (given strictly convex e¤ort costs).
From (9) we have now, since 1 0:
and thus
In a team of n agents where a bonus is o¤ered for team output y n k, the marginal e¤ect of an agent's e¤ort to obtain the bonus is thus determined by the probability that the ensemble of the other n 1 agents achieves exactly the output y n 1 = k 1.
For independent contributions ( = 0) it turns out that
positive i¤ k > np 1 (and k 1). This implies that to implement (symmetric) individual e¤ort p 1 2 k 1 n ; k n it is then optimal to reward for all team outcomes with y n k. The optimal scheme under stochastic independence is thus a threshold scheme, with a threshold adapted to the e¤ort that is to be implemented. We …nd the following.
Proposition 7
For stochastically independent contributions the optimal bonus scheme is a threshold scheme for the team's output, and we have
for k = 1; :::; n 1. Moreover, a larger team will always provide weaker incentives than a smaller one, and thus be less e¢ cient. Speci…cally we have m n+1 (p 1 ) m n (p 1 ) with strict inequality for all p 1 except p 1 = k n , k = 1; :::; n 1.
Consider now correlated outputs ( 6 = 0). To build intuition we consider …rst small teams. For n = 2 and e¤ort p 1 1 2 the optimal bonus scheme here is a scheme with threshold y 2 2, and thus with marginal e¤ect of e¤ort (ME)
This scheme is optimal because we have
The formula for m 2 shows that the marginal e¤ect of individual e¤ort to achieve a team outcome with 2 successes is given by P (y 1 = 1), i.e.
by the probability that the other agent achieves a success. This is trivially true for independent outcomes, where the probability of two successes is p 1 p 2 , and thus the marginal e¤ect of individual e¤ort is given by the other agent's success probability. When 1 0 the same formula also holds for correlated projects.
Consider now, for n = 3 a bonus scheme with threshold y 3 2. From the formula (11) above it follows that the ME for this scheme is given by
where the second equality follows from (7) . Comparing the ME's for the two team sizes, we see that the di¤erence is
For 0 the di¤erence is negative for all p 1 1 2 , but for < 0 the di¤erence is positive for a range of p 1 's exceeding 1 2 . Thus, with negatively correlated outputs, the larger team will provide stronger incentives for a range of e¤ort levels exceeding p 1 = 1 2 . This is due to the fact that under negative correlation and for these e¤orts, the probability that two agents produce exactly one unit of output is higher than the probability that a single agent does so. The marginal incentives for individual e¤ort are then larger in a team of 3 agents than in a team of 2 agents.
Consider now n > 3. Since threshold bonus schemes are optimal for = 0, and the marginal e¤ects of e¤ort @ @p 1 P (y n = k) depend continuously (in fact linearly) on (see formulas (9) and (8)), such threshold schemes will also be optimal for j j small. In this bonus regime we can show that for given team size n, marginal incentives will decrease with increasing for all e¤orts p 1 in an interval I n ( 1 n ; 1 1 n ). Thus, except for very small and very high (perhaps infeasible) e¤ort p 1 , marginal incentives will be higher when individual contributions are negatively correlated compared to nonnegatively correlated, at least for a range of with j j small. In this range, negative covariance will then improve incentives and hence e¢ ciency in the team, while positive covariance will reduce the team's e¢ ciency.
Proposition 8 For given n 3, a threshold bonus scheme is optimal for j j small. In this scheme, the marginal incentive for e¤ ort -and hence the team's e¢ ciency-will be decreasing in for p 1 2 ( n 1 ; n n 1 ) and increasing in for p 1 < n 1 or p 1 > n n 1 , where
This means that if the team's optimal e¤ort under zero correlation entails
, then a stronger positive (negative) covariance will reduce (improve) the team's e¢ ciency for some range of including = 0. Note that the optimal e¤ort p 1 will certainly be contained in I n if the feasible range for e¤ort (measured as the probability of success) is within this interval, i.e. p(e i ) 2 [p 0 ; p] I n .
Comparing team sizes, we have the following result. Moreover, the optimal bonus scheme may then well not be a threshold scheme.
To see this, compare teams of sizes n = 3 and n = 2. Consider a bonus scheme for the larger team that awards for exactly 1 or 3 units of output (y 3 = 1; 3). From (10) and (7) we see that the ME for this scheme is
For = const, the optimal bonus scheme for the smaller team is independent of , and hence has hurdle y 2 1 for p 1 < Comparing the ME's for the two teams we have
This reveals that, provided > To see why a hurdle scheme may well not be optimal under positive correlation, consider
With positive and relatively high correlation, a team of 2 agents is more likely to achieve k = 2 successes than only one success, and then more e¤ort by a third agent will only reduce the probability that the 3-agent team 1 9 It may be noted that > Technically, MLRP does not hold under these conditions. We have the following:
Proposition 10 When individual contributions are correlated, the optimal bonus scheme for the team may well not be a hurdle scheme. In particular, for n = 3 and = const, the optimal scheme awards for team output y 3 2 f1; 3g if the covariance is positive and su¢ ciently large ( > This non-monotonic incentive scheme may look peculiar. Since the team is rewarded for y 3 = 1 but not for y 3 = 2, the agents are in some sense rewarded for failure. But the intuition is simple; under correlated outputs, low e¤ort may yield a high probability for an intermediate result (y 3 = 2), and should thus not be rewarded. However, non-monotonic incentive schemes are rarely observed in practise. But the fact that they may be optimal, indicates that the more standard hurdle schemes can give rise to perverse incentives if the hurdle is not accurately placed.
Conclusion
In relational contracts, the agents'incentives, i.e. the size of the bonuses, are limited by the value of the future relationship. If bonuses are too large (or too small), the principal (or agents) may deviate by not paying as promised, and thereby undermine the relational contract. For a given maximum bonus, the principal must thus look for other ways to strengthen the agents'incentives. In this paper, we show that when the principal contracts with a team of agents, and the maximum bonuses are limited by the relational contract, the principal can strengthen the agents'e¤ort incentives by composing teams that utilize stochastic dependencies between the agents'outputs.
We have shown that e¢ ciency decreases with team size when individual contributions are stochastically independent. This is due to the well known 1=n free-rider problem. However, e¢ ciency may increase with team size if outputs are stochastically dependent, and particularly when individual contributions are negatively correlated. Hence, correlation -and in particular negative correlation -between team members' contributions may enhance team performance. We have also shown that correlation may a¤ect the type of incentive scheme that is optimal for the team. Hurdle schemes may or may not be optimal, depending on the stochastic dependencies. In particular we point out that under correlated outputs, it may be optimal to reward the team for e.g. low and high outputs, but not for intermediate ones.
Stochastic dependencies relates to questions concerning optimal team composition. In the management literature a central question is whether teams should be homogenous or heterogeneous with respect to tasks as well as bio-demographic characteristics (e.g. Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007) . One can conjecture that negative correlations are more associated with heterogeneous teams than homogenous teams, and also more associated with task-related diversity than with bio-demographic diversity. Our model can thus contribute to explain why heterogeneity among team members and task-related diversity can yield considerable e¢ ciency improvements.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Maximizing total surplus ( i W (e i ) i (E( x i j e i ) c(e i ))) subject to EC and the 'modi…ed'IC constraint (1) Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the case of continous outputs (the discrete case is similar), and let g n ( yj e n ) be the density for a team of size n under e¤orts e n = (e 1 :::e n ). By stochastic independence we then have g n+1 ( yj e n+1 ) = R 1 1 g n ( y xj e n )f ( xj e n+1 )dx:
(Densities are zero outside bounded supports.) So for variations in any of e 1 ::e n we have g n+1 e i ( yj e n+1 ) = R 1 1 g n e i ( y xj e n )f ( xj e n+1 )dx
Consider i = 1, and let Y n+1 + = fy : g n+1 e 1 ( yj e n+1 ) > 0g. Then
Given that Y n + = fy : g n e 1 ( yj e n ) > 0g, we have, for any set Y :
Combined with the expression for m n+1 (e 1 ) above this yields
By symmetry this is true for any e i , and this proves the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is obvious from the shape of h() that the FOC for e¤ort has a single solution for s su¢ ciently large, and hence that FOA is then valid. (See also Hwang 2016, p129.)
To see that the optimal solution then must be symmetric, note …rst that the normal density can be written as g(y; l(e 1 :::e n )), with l(e 1 :::e n ) = i e i .
Assume the solution is asymmetric; say that e i < e j . Let
and consider R b 0 (y)g l (y; l(e 1 :::e n ))dy = 1 2
::e n ))dy+
::e n ))dy
Hence the bonus b 0 (y) to each of i and j is feasible and would induce e¤ort at least e i +e j 2 = e 0 from each. Thus a slightly lower bonus to each is feasible and will induce e¤ort e 0 from each. This yields higher value since the objective is concave. Now consider s small. If FOA is valid, the agent's optimal payo¤ is b 1 2 c(e i ). This must be no less than the payo¤ for e i = 0, which is positive, thus we have c(e i ) < b 
This yields
g(y;e) g(y; e)dy+ (ii) Note that, for given e = e the RHS of (14) is strictly decreasing in y 0 , and hence there is a unique y 0 satisfying the equation. Let b h (y) be the associated hurdle scheme. To simplify notation, write u(b; e) =ũ(e) and u(b h ; e) = u(e). Then from (i) we now haveũ(e ) = u(e ) and u e i (e ) > u e i (e ), whereũ e i (e ) = 0 since e is an equilibrium for bonusb(y).
Now assume, to get a contradiction, that there is e 0 i < e i with u(e 0 i ; e i ) > u(e i ; e i ). Then for (e i ) = u(e i ; e i ) ũ(e i ; e i ) we have (e 0 i ) > (e i ) = 0 and 0 (e i ) = u e i (e i ; e i ) > 0. Hence by continuty there must be some e 00 i 2 (e 0 i ; e i ) such that (e 00 i ) = 0 and 0 (e 00 i ) 0. At e 00 i we thus have u(e 00
i ; e i ) =ũ(e 00 i ; e i ) and u e i (e 00 i ; e i ) u e i (e 00 i ; e i ). But this contradicts statement (i) in the lemma. This proves (ii) and thus the lemma. where H() is the CDF for N (0; s 2 ). For = 0 the threshold is that of b h (i.e. y 0 ) and we have by Lemma 2 u(0; e i ; e i ) u(0; e i ; e i ) for all e i < e i ; 
and note that this implies (by the shape of h()):
This in turn implies, since h(y 0
we have u e i ( 0 ; e i ; e i ) > u e i ( 0 ; e i ; e i ) = 0 and hence u( 0 ; e i ; e i ) < u( 0 ; e i ; e i ) for e i 2 [e 0 i ; e i )
If 2(y 0 0 ) e i de…ne e 0 i = 0, and it is then straightforward to see that (18) and hence (19) holds for that case as well. In that case the proof is then complete since (19) implies that no deviations to e i < e i can be pro…table.
For the case e 0 i > 0, de…ne, for e i < e 0 i and 2 [0; 0 ] the payo¤ di¤erence
( ; e i ) = u( ; e i ; e i ) u( ; e i ; e i )
By (15) we know that for = 0 we have (0; e i ) 0 for all e i e 0 i < e i . Let now 2 (0; 0 ), and consider
For < 0 and e i < e 0 i we have y 0 e i > y 0 0 e 0 i > 0 (see (17) ) and hence h(y 0 e i ) < h(y 0 0 e 0 i ). Thus we have
Note that by (17) the last di¤erence can be written as h( x + z) h(x + z) with x; z > 0, and this di¤erence is thus positive (by the shape of h()). Since @ ( ;e i ) @ > 0 we then have, for e i e 0 i :
( 0 ; e i ) = u( 0 ; e i ; e i ) u( 0 ; e i ; e i ) > u(0; e i ; e i ) u(0; e i ; e i )
It now follows from (15) that u( 0 ; e i ; e i ) > u( 0 ; e i ; e i ) for e i e 0 i , This completes the proof that e is a (symmetric) equilibrium for the modi…ed bonus with threshold y 0 0 .
Proof of Proposition 6. As noted in the text, an agent's payo¤ has two local maxima, at e i and at e 0 i < e i , respectively, and e 0 i gives the highest payo¤ for su¢ ciently small s. The critical s is where the two local maxima yield the same payo¤; i.e. b(1 H(0; s)) c(e i ) = b(1 H(e i e 0 i ; s)) c(e 0 i ), where Pr( y > y 0 j e i ; e i ) = 1 H(e i e i ; s) and H( ; s) is the CDF for an N (0; s 2 ) variable. In addition they both satisfy FOC, so bh(e i e 0 i ; s) = c 0 (e 0 i ) and bh(0; s) = c 0 (e i ).
For s below this critical level, the agent's payo¤ is higher at e 0 i . This can be recti…ed by setting a lower threshold y 0 0 < y 0 = ne i , and at the same time increase the bonus level. For y 0 0 = y 0 we have Pr( y > y 0 0 j e i ; e i ) = 1 H(e i e i ; s)
We can then choose and the bonus b such that e i satis…es FOC and yields a payo¤ at least as high as the other local maximum e 0 i , i.e. such that we have
and
The smaller is, the smaller is the required bonus to satisfy FOC for e i .
The minimal such yields equality between the payo¤s. Now, this scheme can at most allow a bonus
Hence, we see that the highest e¤ort e i that can be implemented by this scheme is the e¤ort e i de…ned by the conditions (20 -22) , where all hold with equality. We now show that this is indeed the optimal scheme for s below the critical level where FOA ceases to be valid.
We have H(x; s) = ( 
For c 000 0, so c 0 (e i ) is convex, there can at most be two local maxima (e i and e 0 i ) for the agent's payo¤. Note that for the minimal s = s c for which the FOA is valid, all relations (20 -22) hold with equality, and = 0.
Denote the associated e¤ort and bonus by e i = e c and b = b c , respectively. For s < s c the optimal threshold must be some y 0 0 6 = ne i , thus y 0 0 = ne i , 6 = 0. We show below that > 0, as assumed in the text, is optimal.
First we show that for an optimal > 0 all constraints must bind. To see this, de…ne as the di¤erence in payo¤s between e i and e 0 i , i.e. from (23);
and note that is increasing in b and in . This is so because (by the envelope property) If the payo¤ constraint (23) does not bind, then by reducing , keeping b …xed, e¤ort e i will increase (by FOC), and the EC constraint (25) will be relaxed. The payo¤ constraint (23) must therefore also bind in optimum. Now we show that < 0 cannot be optimal. Suppose it is, i.e. that for some s < s c a hurdle y 0 0 = y 0 0 with 0 < 0 is optimal. The optimal bonus b and e¤ort e i must satisfy FOC. Note that the FOC for e i will also be satis…ed
the payo¤ di¤erence will be strictly higher for = 00 > 0 than for 0 < 0. But then e i is a strict optimum for the agent ( > 0) for = 00 > 0, and in such a case it is, as we have seen above, possible to implement an even higher e¤ort by, say, increasing the bonus somewhat. A hurdle y 0 0 = y 0 0 with 0 < 0 can thus not be optimal.
We now show that e¤ ort e i is higher when s is lower. To this end …x s a < s c , and let the optimal e¤ort, bonus and hurdle parameter be e i = e a , b = b a and = a , respectively. Then = 0 and EC (25) binds. We …rst show that for s < s a e¤ort e i = e a can be implemented with b = b a , and a suitable choice of . Indeed, …x e i = e a and b = b a , and let (s) and e 0 i (s) be de…ned by the FOCs (24) for e i and e 0 i , respectively. For s = s a we have = a and all relations hold with equality. We show below (see (27) ) that the payo¤ di¤erence = ( (s); e 0 i (s)) satis…es d ds < 0 (keeping e i = e a and b = b a …xed). This implies that e i = e a can be implemented with b = b a and = (s) when s < s a , and that the associated payo¤ di¤erence is then strictly positive ( > 0). But in such a case we can, as shown above, implement a strictly higher e¤ort e i > e a . This shows that for s < s a optimal e¤ort is e i > e a , as was to be shown.
Finally we show that in the limit we have e i ! e u as s ! 0. For suppose that (at least along a subsequence) e i ! e l < e u as s ! 0. Note that we then must have s ! 1 as s ! 0. For if not, then b ! 0 by FOC for e i in (24) , which implies a negative payo¤ at e i . For the same reason we must also have e i e 0 i s ! 1. Then we must have e 0 i ! e 0 l = 0 as s ! 0, for otherwise the payo¤ at e 0 i would converge to c(e 0 l ) < 0. This is impossible, since the payo¤ at e 0 i exceeds that at e i = 0, and hence must be non-negative.
Taking limits in the …rst relation (23) with equality, we then get lim b 1 c(e l ) = 0, and hence from the last equation (for b) that c(e l ) = 1 W (e l ).
This cannot hold for e l < e u , hence we must have e l = e u .
It remains to prove In fact, we will show that
To this end, using the FOC (24) we …nd, for the payo¤ at e 0 i :
Similarly, for the payo¤ at e i we …nd
From the FOCs (24) and the fact that 0 (z) = z (z) we obtain by di¤er-
This proves (27) , and thus completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. From (10) with = 0 we have
The square bracket equals 
Note that
i . There we have
where the inequality follows from the square bracket being equal to Veri…cation of (8) Let here P (x 1 :::x n ) denote the joint probability that n outputs take values x 1 :::x n , with x i 2 f0; 1g. No second-or higher-order additive interaction entails that we have (Gupta-Tao 2010)
P (x 1 ;x 2 ;:::xn)
P (x 1 )P (x 2 ) P (xn) = X 1 i;j n P (x i ;x j ) P (x i )P (x j ) n(n 1) 2
+ 1
Assuming this holds for all n > 1, Gupta-Tao (2010) showed that formula (8) then follows, with coe¢ cients a For later use, we note here that for symmetric p i 's the coe¢ cients a where the last equality follows by collecting terms.This veri…es (33) for r = 2.
Similarly we have from (38) and (33) where the last equality follows from
k . This veri…es (33) for 3 r n 2, and completes the proof of Lemma A (i).
Proof Lemma A(ii). For n = 2; 3 the statement is veri…ed directly. For n 4 we now claim that there are numbers n r , such that n r (p 1 ) < n r < 0 for p 1 The last parenthesis is increasing in r and strictly negative (equal to 4) for r = n 1. 
2 (n 1 (3 + n)r)
The last parenthesis is decreasing in r and is strictly negative for r = 2.
This completes the proof of the claim, and hence the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 9. Since all probabilities are linear in , so are m n+1 and m n , and hence also the di¤erencẽ
For = 0 we know that the di¤erence (given by n 0 (p 1 )) is strictly negative except at p 1 = k n , k = 1; :::; n 1, where it is zero. We will now show that n (p 1 ) < 0 at p 1 = k n , k = 1; :::; n 1. It then follows that for j j small, we will have~ n (p 1 ; ) > 0 in a neighborhood of p 1 = k n if < 0, but n (p 1 ; ) < 0 for all p 1 if > 0. The statement in the proposition follows from this.
So consider n (p 1 ) de…ned by (39) , evaluated at p 1 = k n . For = 0 the optimal bonus scheme for team size n is a hurdle scheme where the hurdle shifts from k (for p 1 k n ) to k + 1 (for p 1 > k n ). For j j small, the optimal scheme will also be a hurdle scheme, but it will have hurdle k or k + 1 at p 1 = k n depending on the sign of @ @p 1 P (y n = k) = P (y n 1 = k 1) P (y n 1 = k) = (C n 1
(Here we have used (32) , and the fact that B n 1
The hurdle for the team of size n will be k i¤ the expression in (40) is positive, otherwise it will be k + 1.
For the team of size n + 1 the optimal scheme has hurdle k + 1 at p 1 = k n for j j smal · l. This holds for j j smal · l because it is true for = 0, and because 
